


An Inside Look: Watergate and the World of the CIA



“Are these men really former CIA men or are they still subject to the orders of the CIA? The CIA would like to have it one way, and then to have it overlooked the other way.”

Explosive as the Watergate revelations have been, no disclosure has been more ominous than the 1970 Domestic Intelligence Plan attributed to the pen of Tom Charles Huston. The plan, as revealed last June, provided for the use of electronic surveillance, mail coverage, undercover agents and other measures to an extent unprecedented in domestic intelligence-gathering. This program was to be directed by a committee of representatives from all of the national intelligence agencies. It goes far toward justifying the worst paranoia Americans have felt during the past quarter century over the growth of secrecy and deception in our government. Much of this anxiety relates to what might be called “the CIA Mentality,” the stealthy abuse of power and the practice of deception of the American public—all performed under the cloak of secrecy and often in the name of anticommunism and national security. In fact, what makes the Watergate

case different from other scandals is that the system and methods used, the means by which it was all planned, staffed with experts, financed clandestinely and carried out was all taken from the operating method of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created, and its powers and responsibilities defined, by the National Security Act of 1947. Its character was developed over a span of 11 years by its greatest mentor and guiding spirit, Allen Welsh Dulles. The “Frankenstein” product of this implausible union of a well-intentioned law and of a scheming opportunist is the agency as we find it today.

Before 1953, when Dulles became the Director, Central Intelligence (DCI), the CIA was primarily concerned with performing its assigned task: as the central authority for all of the various intelligence organizations of the government, the CIA’s business was to collect and interpret information gathered by other intelligence units. But that all soon changed.

In 1948, President Truman established a committee to review the CIA, to make recommendations for improvement and to evaluate its past performance. The members of this committee were Allen Dulles, Mathias Correa, and William Jackson, and their report was without question the most important single document on this subject ever pub-

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by L. Fletcher Prouty

“... what really rises up over the storm clouds is the evidence that this ongoing clandestine activity had the approval at least of Nixon, Laird and Helms.”

lished in this country. In it, Dulles (the principal author) firmly proposed that the CIA must not only coordinate intelligence but that it must collect intelligence and that it must be authorized to carry out covert, clandestine operations. Needless to say, during his 11 years with the CIA, Allen Dulles saw to it that the Agency did in fact carry out these activities—federal law notwithstanding. Dulles' change of emphasis led to the overshadowing of the rest of the agency by the “dirty tricks” or “operations” division.

To understand the importance of this change, it is necessary to know a bit about the CIA's three divisions. Each has its own distinct character, interests, and powers. The whole operation—men, money, materials, aircraft, bases overseas, people and all kinds of weird and wonderful gadgetry—is supported by the Deputy Director, Support (DD/S). Without the DD/S, that most competent and experienced part of the CIA, none of the remainder could operate. Much could be written about the special expertise of the DD/S, especially in the area of money manipulation—a subject which takes on special significance in view of Watergate's “laundering” of money. This is one of those secret arts which the CIA didn't plan to reveal to anyone; but now it finds its alumni practicing the art for a variety of political purposes.

A second part of the Agency is headed by the Deputy Director, Intelligence—this is the true intelligence side of the house. The intelligence professionals are the people who do the statutory work of the Agency, who turn out its most important product—the intelligence reports. They are heeded too little by too few people. Although DD/I employees are usually perfectly open about their assignments, their work is quiet and not nearly as spectacular as that of

their covert brethren. No DD/I has ever become the DCI, and none is ever likely to. The DD/I might have risen in status and importance had James Schlesinger remained head of the agency. Now, with Schlesinger's removal to the Defense Department, we shall never know. The Directorate of Intelligence suffers from the pangs of fluctuating fortunes and of low morale. It certainly is not the glamor center of the intelligence community.

The glamor in the CIA resides with the Deputy Director, Operations (DD/O—sometimes DD/P—Deputy Director, Plans)—the dirty tricks director. The men who have held this post have been blamed for some of the CIA's most spectacular gaffes: Frank Wisner was fired for the failure of an anti-Sukarno “rising” in Indonesia in the '50s; Richard Bissell was canned for the Bay of Pigs. But three men have risen from DD/O to the Directorship of Central Intelligence—Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, and now William E. (Bill) Colby.

The appointment of a man of Colby's background as DCI expresses the continuing power of “dirty tricks” within the CIA, and in the government as a whole. Bill Colby was the senior CIA man in South Vietnam and the leader of the vaunted pacification program, including the infamous Phoenix project. Pacification—with all its cruelties and insidiousness—had been used by the French in their actions in Indochina at least as far back as the early 1950s. Later they used it as a major plan of undercover action in Algeria. Ed Lansdale, Desmond Fitzgerald, Colby and others came across this French doctrine and took it over as a part of their own method of operation. Pacification, in this special sense, became a part of the U.S. Army Special Forces “Green Beret” training doctrine. The Phoenix Project was the assassination (to use Lyndon Johnson's term, the “Murder, Inc.”) part of pacification.

It was Bill Colby who raised pacification to its highest and most deadly levels and taught the Vietnamese to implement the Phoenix program through which they attempted to terrorize and liquidate the political apparatus believed to direct and control the Communist effort in South Vietnam. Colby sought to make the ARVN into better para-military fighters—capable of suppressing threats and then “pacifying” the country by terrorism, assassination and any other means. How and where Colby plans to apply such deadly skills as DCI remains to be seen. But unquestionably, Colby's appointment fulfills Allen Dulles's highest hopes for a dynamic “operational” CIA, reaching way beyond the mere gathering and interpretation of intelligence data.

(Continued on page 47)

Watergate folklore has it that the White House “plumbers” got their name because of their assignment to stop “leaks” from government agencies to the news media. As a matter of fact, the “dirty tricks” operatives in the intelligence community have long been called by a similar name—“Acme Plumbers.” Maybe the green young men in the White House meant to use intelligence community jargon when they nicknamed their special investigations unit the “plumbers.” If so, they got it wrong, but their mistake was prophetic: just plain “plumber,” without the brand name, is CIA slang for an undercover man who botches the job.



PHOTOGRAPH

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[SUPER-CRONKITE]

It was General Walter Bedell Smith who instituted the second great step towards expansion of CIA influence in government policy—the daily intelligence briefing. After the intelligence community was caught off guard by the fighting that erupted in Korea in June of 1950, President Truman appointed Smith as CIA Director and urged him to shake up the Agency. Smith brought Dulles and Jackson into the CIA right away, dusted off their old report and began to implement some of its findings. More significantly, he initiated the practice of the daily briefing for the President and all senior government officials.

The daily intelligence briefing was instituted with the best intentions. If the CIA had previously failed to keep the President and his highest executives adequately informed on a frequent and regular basis, then it seemed only right to set up a procedure which would remedy that situation. But in practice, this procedure served quite a different purpose. By involving the President directly in intelligence, on a day-to-day basis, the briefing became a form of executive entrapment. It enabled the CIA to focus the President's attention on those areas and courses of action in which the Agency had some vested interest. The beginning of this daily briefing in 1952-53 was also the beginning of a power shift toward the CIA and away from State and Defense.

Through the Eisenhower years this shift was not entirely apparent. General Eisenhower had been accustomed to the utilization of a strong staff all of his life. He understood the value of a staff organization, and he used such an organization effectively. Therefore, the daily briefing was, to him, no more than that. He would receive the briefing, but he would wait for his Cabinet to advise him on each matter following the briefing.

But when Kennedy became President, he and his closest advisors were captivated by this daily "Super-Cronkite" presentation—so much so that he saw no reason to convene the National Security Council (NSC). Not

being trained or especially skilled in the administrative process, JFK felt more at home with his closest friends, advisors and relatives, and most of them were not Cabinet officials. Thus the Cabinet gave way to the inner circle; high security classification and the exclusion inherent in the "need to know" system reduced that circle to a very small number. As Lyman Kirkpatrick, former Executive Director of the CIA, has said, "President Kennedy paid for the abandoning of the NSC at the Bay of Pigs. He had allowed himself and his principal advisors to be made the captives of the proponents of the plan. . . . If the President had insisted that the deliberations on the operation be conducted within the framework of an NSC system, with appropriate staff work and review, there would have been a much greater chance that he would have received a more realistic appraisal of its chances for success (or failure)." No one could speak with more authority on this subject than Kirkpatrick: he was one of the architects of the daily briefing idea, before the concept was turned from its original purpose.

Ten years later, the daily intelligence briefing is as captivating as ever. When John Mitchell referred to his daily 8:30 a.m. White House meeting during his Watergate testimony, he was referring to the CIA intelligence briefing. The CIA gives sneak previews of the coming morning's briefing to some favored assistants to the officials who attend the morning sessions, to keep the assistants up with what their bosses are thinking about. In this way the influence of the briefing has spread far beyond the White House, and has become a central part of much of bureaucratic Washington's day.

In addition to briefing the President daily, the CIA has managed to plant its own man in the White House—usually in the person of the Presidential national security advisor. Before the CIA itself was created, Nelson Rockefeller spoke for the intelligence community to President Truman. Gordon Grey served in that role under Eisenhower. Under the cover title of "military advisor," Maxwell Taylor actually represented the CIA in the Kennedy White House. McGeorge Bundy, another CIA front man, used his position as a Presidential advisor to tre-

mendously strengthen the Agency's covert role in Vietnam. These advisors usually represented the point of view of the DD/O, the dirty tricks division. As such, they sometimes came into conflict with the DD/I, which prepares the daily intelligence report. The conflict between Bundy and the intelligence division surfaced in the Pentagon Papers—a rare glimpse into the internecine battles that go on in the intelligence community. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, seems to have achieved a rare balance between the DD/I and DD/O viewpoints. Like his predecessors, he depends on the CIA for his enormous influence in the White House. Alexander Haig, formerly Kissinger's assistant, now White House chief of staff, is also CIA-oriented. Haig was the army officer who acted as liaison between the CIA and the Kennedy administration. He is indebted to the Agency for his lightning ascent from major in 1962 to four-star general in 1973.

The rise of the CIA covert operations section, the institution of the daily Presidential briefing, and the placement of an Agency-oriented advisor in every Administration, all have given the CIA an enormous, powerful voice in high level policy making.

[NEW TRICKS]

With the winding down of combat activities in Southeast Asia and the new atmosphere of detente with both China and Russia, there was speculation that the CIA—especially the dirty tricks division—would lose its grip on America's policymakers. The replacement of old dirty trickster Richard Helms with James Schlesinger as Director, Central Intelligence seemed like a victory for intelligence gathering activities over covert operations.

Actually, Helms's new assignment as Ambassador to Iran points to the continuing importance of dirty tricks in American foreign policy. The removal of Richard Helms from the DCI position to Iran may appear as a demotion, banishment from the center of power for that career CIA man. But remember, Helms has always been a covert operations man (DD/O area). He came up through the ranks from the old Office of Strategic Services

(OSS). He was never an intelligence (DD/I) man.

Therefore a return to Iran is actually a strong assignment for Helms, for the CIA has a long history of covert activity there since the removal of Mossadegh and the cultivation of the Shah. The CIA helped to sponsor and establish the Iranian international airline. It has developed a string of radar sites there, and for years the Agency has carefully selected Military Aid Program trainees from Iran to travel to the U.S. for "Technical Training" (and a high priced holiday)—thereby endearing itself to many of the leaders and important families of Iran.

Iran seems destined to become the Thailand of the Middle East. It was "Wild Bill" Donovan—the former head of the OSS—who, as Ambassador to Thailand, created that U.S. bastion in Southeast Asia. It will be Helms, the former DCI, who will create the new American base of operations for the Middle East in Iran. This assignment will prove to have been one of the most significant and influential made by Nixon in his second term. Helms is a most experienced and able man and the results of his assignment to this not so obscure post will be well worth watching, especially by those who still wonder how and why the U.S. became involved in Vietnam.

The Watergate revelations, too, have been read as a sign of declining CIA influence on the White House. On the surface, it appears that Nixon set up his own intelligence and dirty tricks operations over the heads of established agencies. But there is evidence to the contrary.

The 1970 "Huston" domestic intelligence plan is the most dangerous of all the "Watergate" episodes. It is grossly mistaken to think that one man in the White House—Tom Huston—put together and wrote the manifesto. In fact, an informed look at the 1970 domestic intelligence plan suggests that certain parts of the intelligence establishment provided the guiding force behind it.

It has been revealed that the CIA concurred with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the White House in support of the plan that Tom Huston presented. FBI Director J.

Edgar Hoover had no other choice than to oppose this action because any such domestic intelligence activity would have all but killed his Bureau. Indeed, it may well be that such long-time Bureau adversaries as the CIA and the Department of the Army saw in this proposal an opportunity to attempt a coup against the power of the FBI, on the dual assumption that the President wanted this domestic intelligence plan badly enough to side with its proponents and that Hoover was getting too feeble to fight the big battle again. As we know, Hoover rose to the occasion once more—not because he disagreed with the politics of the idea, but to maintain the Bureau's hold on most aspects of internal security.

More ominous than the plan itself is the fact that everyone in authority—from President on down—approved and went along with it. It is, indeed, even more insidious than is immediately apparent. Note that the National Security Agency and the Army are very close. They are brothers in the Defense establishment. Army Intelligence has, for a long time, willingly permitted itself to become involved in domestic activities. Once the Army performed this role because it was professional, incorruptible, above politics. Later it gave active and willing support to other CIA/White House activities. And finally it began to actively seek such a role to the exclusion of others, such as the CIA or the FBI.

In this domestic intelligence scheme, the Army was joined by the NSA to present a strong front—the Army's manpower strength plus NSA's unequalled technological ability. It was, no doubt, an easy step from that position to recruitment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) behind the plan. Always eager to joust with the giants, the DIA would willingly take an active part against the CIA and the FBI. It is by far the junior member of this highly competitive community and it sought this opportunity to vault into a position of prominence with the President and the White House.

The role of these agencies in the drafting of the Huston plan can be estimated if we treat the plan as a typical interdepartmental staff paper, which it probably was. The interdepartmental staff paper is not an un-

common document. Those familiar with this rather rarified art know its characteristics. First of all, following the initial meetings when the project is defined as well as possible, each agency goes back to its own confines, brings to play its best and most experienced people and begins the drafting of its own version of the paper. In fact, in the case of the Department of Defense, it may draft several different papers and may even call upon the singular expertise of think tanks such as RAND and IDA to assure the quality and thoroughness of the product.

At this point, the work has at least two primary objectives. Each agency must assure the survival of its own primary viewpoints and each agency vies to have its paper selected as the principal substance of the final product. In accordance with this established practice a Tom Charles Huston could be given the task of working up the final draft. Inevitably, and to simplify his own task, he would read all proposals, select the one he liked best, work a few subsidiary ideas into it from the other papers, and put together the "final."

Each participant, even experienced outsiders, knows how to tell what went into the final. When one principal writes about his own agency he will scrupulously mention the others, such as FBI, CIA, NSA, but because he is signing his own paper and because it is on his own letterhead, he finds it unnecessary to include his own agency, such as DIA, except perhaps for a perfunctory comment or the more or less informal reference to his boss or other principal. Thus a very educated guess at the true authorship of the "Huston" document leads one to assign original authorship to the DIA with some additions by the CIA.

If this reading is correct, the Huston memo leads us to the main links between the intelligence community and the White House. The memo directly involves Nixon. He admitted approving it. It directly involves Helms. He was the approving DCI. And it also must directly have involved Melvin Laird. Although his role in this action has been obscure and somewhat overlooked, as Secretary of Defense at the time the memo was approved there is no way Laird could not have been involved when

major subordinate elements of the DOD, such as the Army and the DIA, were involved. And furthermore, whenever such subjects as this one are processed, only a limited number of people work on it, and only the Secretary or his deputy would have had the right to approve it once it had been prepared to leave the Pentagon for delivery to the White House. No one would have dared go around that system. Since Laird did nothing to stop this paper from going to the White House, he—like Helms—gave at least his tacit approval.

Alexander Haig, who owes much of his career to his CIA connection, is now the President's chief of staff. He has been most influential in encouraging Nixon to take a hard line on Watergate. Melvin Laird, who evidently gave his approval to the Huston plan, is currently Nixon's chief advisor on domestic affairs. Richard Helms remains in charge of our operations in Iran, and dirty trickster William Colby has taken over at CIA headquarters itself. The presence of all these men in high places in the Nixon administration, plus the fact that the Huston plan itself was never formally rescinded (and a plan of such magnitude, involving several agencies as well as the White House, could hardly be rescinded by word of mouth) all suggests that the intelligence community's influence over the White House is greater after the Watergate upheaval than ever before.

["ONCE A SPY . . ."]

At this point it may be speculation to attribute to the domestic intelligence plan more than can be read in those papers released to date. But the same White House group which fostered that plan was the sponsor of Watergate in all its ramifications. And one of the telling features of the Watergate episode is that it drew together a number of CIA personnel—past and present.

The U.S. Marines have always boasted, "There are no ex-Marines. Once a Marine always a Marine." In the FBI of Hoover's day one would hear the same sentiment. Although the CIA does not make this boast publicly, it is in fact true that once a man joins the CIA, volunteers to go through its super-secret training, is branded by the

black box (polygraph) and serves in areas of deep secrecy through a long and perilous career—he never leaves the CIA. Though he may sever his service by formal retirement, let him suffer from a mental illness or fall into the habit of drinking or develop some other compromising environment or infirmity, and the CIA will show up to see that he does not stray from the narrow path.

What is tradition to the Marines is a law with the CIA, and it has been upheld by the courts. A man may leave physically, but let him decide to write about his experiences and he finds out all too soon that he has not actually severed his ties with the Agency. Recall that the Agency has obtained an injunction against Victor Marchetti to keep him from writing for at least the next 15 years. Consider the implications of such a legal decision in the case of something like Watergate. Are these men—the Hunts, McCords, and the Cubans—really former CIA men or are they still subject to the orders of the CIA? The CIA would like to have it one way, and then to have it overlooked the other way.

Therefore when a former high-ranking member of the CIA—Hunt—is uncovered in the Watergate, when it is discovered that he had employed his old Cuban associates from an earlier decade, and when it is learned that he had no trouble at all getting active and willing assistance from the CIA for his most unusual capers, one may be excused for believing that the CIA did indeed participate—even from behind the scenes—in these prohibited and illegal domestic activities, despite claims to the contrary.

Although many of the loose ends remain to be investigated, there must have been some active relationship during the past decade between the Cubans and Howard Hunt—or whoever it was who brought them together again after 11 years—to explain their ready availability for participation in the Watergate and Ellsberg affairs. If one may judge from the amount of money given to Barker alone during this period, and from the even greater amount raised and expended to pay all of these men after their capture, they must be much more valuable to someone than their participation in Watergate alone would warrant.

[IF NIXON DIDN'T KNOW . . .]

Through all of this there is one most alarming and portentous theme. President Nixon has said that he did not know anything about the Watergate. It is hardly important whether he knew about the single break-in by those men on that night; but it is of extreme importance if what he says really means that he was totally unaware of the whole thing from the early Liddy-Segretti plans through the coverup. To believe President Nixon one must then admit that there are men of great authority and of great responsibility at the very top of our government who took it upon themselves to carry out these political schemes, to use the CIA and the FBI, and to become a government unto themselves.

It would be a grave turn of events to learn that President Nixon did know and did endorse and participate in Watergate. It would be much worse to find out that he did not know anything about it: that would mean things have gotten so far out of hand that those men whom he trusted and who were running the White House and its political and governmental activities did so without his knowledge and approval.

This suggests a certain line of speculation. In the July 1973 issue of *The Atlantic*, Leo Janos writes about some of his last conversations with Lyndon B. Johnson. In a remarkable few lines on the subject of the JFK assassination Janos quotes LBJ as saying, "I never believed that Oswald acted alone, although I can accept that he pulled the trigger." Johnson told Janos that he believed the assassination in Dallas was part of a conspiracy, and that he rejected the verdict of the Warren Commission Report.

In view of the strange events surrounding Watergate, this statement of LBJ's takes on special significance. Why did Johnson not publicly state that he disagreed with the report? Could it have been that the same conspiracy that he believed killed Kennedy also held him, the President of the United States, in its power?

Looking back to President Eisenhower's term, we recall that the four-power Paris Summit Conference scheduled for May, 1960, was

shattered by the crash of Gary Powers' U-2 spy plane in the heart of Russia two weeks before. The chances are good that the flight and the loss of this aircraft at that crucial time were also part of a conspiracy.

At the time the U-2 incident occurred, I was working on aerial surveillance over China. We had received presidential orders to discontinue overflights during that pre-summit period. Most likely the same orders applied to flights over Russia. Yet someone must have ordered the fatal U-2 flight.

Furthermore, when Eisenhower issued his first cover story after the Russians announced they had shot down the plane, he said that it was a weatherplane from a Turkish base. Khrushchev subsequently revealed that the flight originated in Pakistan. Even

if Eisenhower were covering up, he would have no reason to lie about the place of origin—unless he was deliberately misinformed. Someone, it may be, had deliberately embarrassed President Eisenhower, and wrecked the summit.

This was no small matter. If Eisenhower did not know about the U-2 conspiracy, Kennedy very likely ran afoul of a deeper conspiracy, as LBJ's ambiguous statement suggests. It resulted in his death. In other words, for attempting to control whatever it was that challenged him, he too was overruled—by a gun. And then LBJ could not openly confront the issue of the Warren Commission Report. This coupled with his unusual and most uncharacteristic withdrawal from the reelection race may have signaled his in-

ability to cope with this overwhelming power. And now President Nixon claims that he did not know about Watergate. If that is so, then what is the power that has brought Nixon, like his predecessors, such unexpected grief?

A look at the power and the history of the 15 years lying behind Watergate—at the CIA and the espionage establishment tied to Gordon Liddy's bungling burglars and the bright young men who proposed Gestapo-like plans for the White House—suggests that there was indeed a conspiracy—possibly one whose reach extended beyond CREEP and even the White House itself. Eisenhower predicted we would have trouble with the vast contending powers in this country. He was right. ■

POLICE POLITICS

(From page 27)

1968 and a host of student demonstrations in which we saw young people beaten by the police."

Immediately, Foundation staffers began looking for police departments amenable to experimentation where the Ford money might do the most "good." The idea was to provide funds and expertise and political support for change that could be emulated by police around the country. Dallas, Dayton, Detroit, and Cincinnati were early possibilities. So was Kansas City, and Furstenberg and Kiley flew out to interview Police Chief Clarence Kelley.

Furstenberg was enthralled. "It was a very unusual department," he said, "a high technology department, with helicopters and a computer system—but it wasn't technocratic. Kelley loved to shake things up; he'd put very young men in middle-level positions. It wasn't a 'military' department."

"Kansas City became a showcase department of the Police Foundation," Furstenberg said. By the time Kelley was appointed head of the FBI this year, his department had been granted almost \$665,000 by the Foundation, just behind Cincinnati and Dallas in total grant money.

Kelley remained a favorite of Furstenberg's and Rogovin's, although at one time—for reasons of internal Foundation politics—Kiley seemed to prefer Cincinnati's force. When Nixon's latest attorney general, Elliott

Richardson, set about to look for an FBI director, he called Rogovin—his onetime assistant in the Massachusetts justice department—who recommended Kelley for the job. Richardson's administrative assistant in Washington, Jonathan Moore, checked out Kelley with Furstenberg and got a similarly enthusiastic response.

"I first came across Clarence when I was at the Crime Commission in the late '60s," Rogovin told me. "Then at the Police Foundation I went out to Kansas City and talked with Kelley. I emerged very impressed with his innovations. He said he wanted to test that holy of holies in the police field, the preventive patrol, the proposition that random movement of police through an area deters crime. Kelley's feeling was that change would only come if his own people were involved at the bottom; change wouldn't come from the top, from a lot of fancy consultants. He was practical but really innovative."

Kelley represents one of those reform archetypes that foundations find so attractive: the practical-but-innovative ideal. He is one of a coterie of police chiefs-with-hearts-of-gold that the Police Foundation organized, more or less, into a functional model of police reform. Money, manpower and political resources were then put behind that model and Ford's way of reformism was delineated.

[ON THE ALERT]

Closer examination of Kelley's policing policies in Kansas City indicate that the reformers were somewhat too enthusiastic at first blush. An ex-FBI agent, Kelley is more a traditionalist than the liberal experts like to admit. His rough handling of the black rebellion in Kansas City six years ago earned him the undying enmity of even moderate black leaders in that city. "Kelley's conventional in many ways," Furstenberg said not long ago. "There's all that crime-fighting crap. And he handled the '67 riot in '67 ways, to protect life and property, and so forth. He spread gas. We don't believe in it any more, and he's said as much, too."

Kelley also made Kansas City the leader in the computerization of police information. ALERT—the data retrieval and information storage system—is supposed to help policemen pick up fugitives and guard themselves against potential assaulters. But ALERT's databank includes lists of "activists" and "militants" with no reason other than activism or militancy for inclusion. Other names are listed as "suspected" narcotics users or sexual "deviants" even though there is no record of conviction for any crime.

Police Foundation reformers are mildly annoyed by Kelley's reliance on